Maintenance of Peace and Security by Central Organs or with their Authorization

The collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter was never established, but a number of mechanisms have been established which try to achieve collective security.

14.1.1 Resort to Force by States

On a few occasions the SC (Security Council) has authorized states to use force against another State that had threatened peace, committed a breach of the peace, or engaged in aggression.

· 1950 – taking advantage of absence of Soviet delegate, SC authorized member states (led by US) to assist South Korea in repelling aggression of North Korea, use of UN flag during military operations allowed (Resolutions 82-84/1950)

· 1990 – SC authorized member states to use all necessary means – force on a large scale – to repel Iraqi aggression against Kuwait (Resolution 678/1990)

SC has also authorized force to enforce economic, not just political, objectives.

· 1966 – SC called upon UK to halt by use of force if necessary the passage of ships carrying oil to Southern Rhodesia, against oil embargo

· 1990 – SC said member states could inspect and verify the cargo and destination of every ship crossing Gulf to ensure it was not violating embargo in Iraq.

States to halt all inward and outward shipping to ensure implementation of economic measures:

· 1993 – Yugoslavia – 787/1992, 820/1993

· Somalia – 794/1992

· Haiti – 875/1993 and 917/1994

· Liberia – 1083/1997

· Sierra Leone – 1132/1997

SC gradually established a direct link between humanitarian crises and threats to the peace – one of the three possible conditions that could trigger SC action under Chapter VII. This enlarged the concept of threat to the peace laid down in Art. 39 (Chapter VII) of UN Charter, to include humanitarian crises, once considered sovereign to domestic jurisdiction.

Authorization of use of force to establish secure environment for humanitarian relief operations:

· 1993 – to create safe havens in Bosnia and Herzegovina by authorizing air attacks (Resolutions 836 and 844/1993)

· 1992 – Somalia (Resolution 794/1992) and 1994 - Rwanda (929/1994) – large military operations conducted by ‘coalitions of willing’ to achieve humanitarian objectives (distribution of relief supplies, protecting displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk

BUT using humanitarian intervention grounds as a reason for use of force can be a slippery slope, and SC is reluctant to invoke and vague about the reasons / conditions.

SC has also authorized states to use force in order to restore democracy or public order

· 1994 - Haiti – States could set up an international force and use all necessary means to facilitate departure of military leaders and allow return of democratically-elected President Aristide (Res. 940/1994)

· 1997 - Albania – after request from Albania, SC authorized intervention (Res 1101/1997)

· 1999 – East Timor – authorized intervention to prevent internal disorders from turning into combat situations

History shows that although SC bears overall political responsibility for authorized operations, member States retain command and control over their armed forces, and thus they carry out operations, with only obligation to report to the SC on a regular basis.

This authorization system has become standing practice and is recognized as consistent with Chapter VII.

14.2.1 Maintenance or Restoration of Peace by Regional or Other Organizations

SC has implicitly authorized regional or other organizations to use force.

· Yugoslavia – SC authorized both maritime and air operations, referring to a possible implementation through the Western European Union and NATO. After war, it authorized NATO to establish a multi-national force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1031/1995 and 1088/1996).

· Kosovo – SC authorized NATO to deploy an international security presence in Kosovo (1244/1999).

BUT Kosovo put UN authorization system at risk, because NATO attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without SC authorization, in light of the gross human rights violations perpetrated against Kosovar population. NATO’s actions are considered a breach of the UN Charter, but in Resolution 1244/1999, the SC endorsed its actions after the fact.

This may have created start of a customary rule legitimizing forcible intervention for humanitarian purposes without the need for formal SC authorization.

14.1.3 Maintenance or Restoration of Peace upon Authorization of the GA

“Uniting for Peace” resolution – empowers the General Assembly to recommend that member States adopt forcible measures against a state held responsible by the Organization for a breach of the ban on the threat or use of force

· pushed by the US in 1950 as a counter-weight to Soviet power

· became irrelevant once Soviet Union returned to SC, and once GA became less keen on the West following decolonization.