The Treatise “On the Vices and Virtues” in the Context of the Interpretation of Aristotle Ethical Categories

Ethics is perhaps the most deeply rooted in the spiritual (political, social) culture of Ancient Greek City-States field of Aristotle’s philosophy. Researchers had long ago noticed that in the “Nicomachean Ethics” the thoughts of Aristotle are intertwined with the ideas of his predecessors, and of everyday vocabulary of the demos, which was accustomed to evaluate different actions of politicians, military leaders and other public figures, as well as the actions of ordinary citizens. Thus, in the “Nicomachean Ethics” we can see a complete moral culture of the Greeks, without a knowledge of which it is hardly possible to understand accurately the ethical teachings of Aristotle. For the reconstruction of its cultural context we should involve works, on the one hand, of the same order with the texts of Aristotle and, on the other hand, works, stimulating the outlook at the ethical categories from the other side. In our opinion, these criteria correspond to the treatise of the Corpus Aristotelicum “On virtues and vices”.

As it is well known, Aristotle's ethical writings include four treatises: “Nicomachean Ethics”, “Great Ethics”, “Eudemian Ethics” and the shortest and at the same time the most controversial treatise “On virtues and vices” (Π ε ρ ὶ Ἀ ρ ε τ ῶ ν κ α ὶ Κ α κ ι ῶ ν, De Virtutibus et Vitiis Libellus). Most scholars dispute the authorship of this treatise, although they recognize its undoubted belonging to the peripatetic tradition. This text is not translated to Russian.

The content of this text resembles the content of second book of the “Nicomachean Ethics” with its overview of main moral virtues. Brief comparison of these texts reveals two fundamental differences. First, the author of “On virtues and vices” follows the Platonic psychology, and directly puts it: “τ ρ ι μ ε ρ ο ῦ ς δ ὲ κ α τ ὰ τ ῆ ς ψ υ χ ῆ ς λ α μ β α ν ο μ έ ν η ς Π λ ά τ ω ν α ”. Then he distributes all the vices and virtues according to the three parts of the human soul: the rational part of the soul (logistikon) he considers prudence (φ ρ ό ν η σ ι ς) as virtue and folly (ἀ φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η) as vice, to the passionate part of the soul (θ υ μ ο ε ι δ ο ῦ ς) he relates meekness (π ρ α ό τ η ς) and courage (ἀ ν δ ρ ε ί α) as virtues, irritability (ὀ ρ γ ι λ ό τ η ς) and cowardice (δ ε ι λ ί α) as vices, to the sensual part (epithumetikon) he relates chastity (σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η) and temperance (self-control) (ἐ γ κ ρ ά τ ε ι α) as virtues, dissoluteness (ἀ κ ο λ α σ ί α) and intemperance (ἀ κ ρ ά τ ε ι α) as vices, to the entire soul – justice (δ ι κ α ι ο σ ύ ν η), nobility, liberality (ἐ λ ε υ θ ε ρ ι ό τ η ς) and generosity (μ ε γ α λ ο ψ υ χ ί α) as virtues, injustice (ἀ δ ι κ ί α), meanness (stinginess) (ἀ ν ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ι ό τ η ς) and cowardice (μ ι κ ρ ο ψ υ χ ί α) as vices. Secondly, the author maintains binary nomenclature by contrasting the vices to the virtues. Aristotle in “Nicomachean Ethics” puts forward a different ethical conception – the conception of virtue as something equally distant from two extremes. Meekness (π ρ α ό τ η ς) is opposed not only to irritability (ὀ ρ γ ι λ ό τ η ς), but also to gentleness (aorgesia). Courage (ἀ ν δ ρ ε ί α) is opposed not only to cowardice (δ ε ι λ ί α), but also to “aphobia” - lack of fear (recklessness). Chastity (σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η) is opposed not not only to dissoluteness (ἀ κ ο λ α σ ί α), but also to insensitivity (anaisthetos). Justice is not considered by Aristotle in any of the opposition. Nobility, liberality (ἐ λ ε υ θ ε ρ ι ό τ η ς) is opposed not only to avarice (ἀ ν ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ι ό τ η ς), but also to prodigality (asotia). Generosity (μ ε γ α λ ο ψ υ χ ί α) is opposed not only to cowardice (μ ι κ ρ ο ψ υ χ ί α), but also to arrogance.

Aristotle, in contrast to the anonymous author, does not consider the prudence and recklessness, self-control and of intemperance (khaunotes). Nevertheless, Aristotle investigates the nature of virtues, which were not included in the list of “On vices and virtues”: splendor (megaloprepeia), ambition (philotimia), truthfulness (aletheia), wit (eytrapelia), friendliness (philia), shame (aidos), indignation (nemesis). And, as it can be seen, a number of categories is the same in both texts, that allows us to relate their content. The value of the treatise “On vices and virtues” is that each vice and each virtue is clarified through the introduction of an additional number of categories which, apparently, was considered by the author as not requiring further explanation. In this respect, those categories are worthy of attention, which coincide in the “On virtues and vices” and in the “Nicomachean Ethics”.

Next, we give the translation into Russian of several statements from the treatise.

Thus, the treatise “On virtues and vices” gives a rich material for clarifying of the interpretation of the basic categories of Aristotelian moral philosophy in general, and of the “Nicomachean Ethics” in particular.

[13] Larisa Tonoyan

St. Petersburg State University, Russian Federation