Clash of globalizations

What is the state of international relations today? All previous models come up hard against three realities. First, rivalries among great powers (and the capacity of smaller states to exploit such tensions) have most certainly not disappeared. For a while now, however, the existence of nuclear weapons has produced a certain degree of prudence among the powers that have them. The risk of destruction that these weapons hold has moderated the game and turned nuclear arms into instruments of last resort. But the game could heat up as more states seek other WMD as a way of narrowing the gap between the nuclear club and the other powers. The sale of such weapons thus becomes a hugely contentious issue, and efforts to slow down the spread of all WMD, especially to dangerous «rogue» states, can paradoxically become new causes of violence.

Second, if wars between states are becoming less common, wars within them are on the rise — as seen in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, much of Africa, and Sri Lanka. Uninvolved states first tend to hesitate to get engaged in these complex conflicts, but then they (sometimes) intervene to prevent these conflicts from turning into regional catastrophes.

Third, states' foreign policies are shaped not only by realist geopolitical factors such as economic and military power but by domestic politics. Even in undemocratic regimes, forces such as xenophobic passions, economic grievances, and transnational ethnic solidarity can make policymaking far more complex and less predictable.

In fact, globalization has three forms, each with its own problems. First, is economic globalization, which results from recent revolution in technology, information, trade, foreign investment, and international business. The main actors are companies, investors, banks and private services industries, as well as states and international organizations. The specialization and integration of firms make it possible to increase aggregate wealth, but the logic of pure capitalism does not favor social justice. Economic globalization has thus become a formidable cause of inequality among and within states, and the concern for global competitiveness limits the aptitude of states and other actors to address this problem.

Next comes cultural globalization. It stems from the technological revolution and economic globalization, which together foster the flow of cultural goods. Here the key choice is between uniformization (often termed «Americanization») and diversity. The result is both a «disenchantment of the world» (in Max Weber's words) and a reaction against uniformity. The latter takes form in a renaissance of local cultures and languages as well as assaults against Western culture, which is denounced as an arrogant bearer of secular, revolutionary ideology and a mask for US hegemony.

Finally, there is political globalization, a product of the other two. It is characterized by the preponderance of the United States and its institutions and by a vast array of international and regional organizations. It is also marked by private institutions that are neither governmental nor purely national — say, Doctors Without Borders or Amnesty International¹.

For one thing, globalization is neither inevitable nor irresistible. Rather, it is largely an American creation, rooted in the period after World War II and based on US economic might. Second, globalization's reach remains limited because it excludes many poor countries. Third, the attractive idea of improving the human condition through the abolition of barriers is dubious. Globalization is in fact only a sum of techniques (audio and videocassettes, the Internet) that are at disposal of states or private actors. Self-interest and ideology, not humanitarian reasons, are what drive these actors.

Another contradiction is also at work. There is the relationship between globalization and violence. The traditional state of war, even if it is limited in scope, still persists. There are high risks of regional explosions in the Middle East and in East Asia, and these could seriously affect relations between the major powers. The classic distrust among international actors who prefer to try to preserve their security alone or through traditional alliances, prevent a more satisfactory institutionalization of world politics — for example, an increase of the UN's powers. Globalization far from spreading peace, thus seems to foster conflicts and resentments.