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A Soviet amplification
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“There is an obvious connection, ” says the Tass statement on Afghanistan of December 1979, “between visits of American emissaries to Pakistan, their visits to some areas in Afghanistan and the operations of the rebel forces. It is not a chance coincidence that the mutiny in Herat to which Afghan reaction Washington and Peking were establishing special significance was started immediately after one of the ringleaders of Afghan counterrevolutionaries was received at the U.S. Department of State. There is data about the attempts of U.S. representatives to get from the Pakistani leadership a consent to still wider use of Pakistani territory for sending armed groups into Afghanistan. Even wider participation in aggressive actions against Afghanistan was being demanded of Pakistan.
“There is no need for special insight to be able to see through the motives of the United States’s actions. There are figures in Washington who persistently look for replacements for the positions which were lost as a result of the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran. Cracks appeared in the notorious ‘strategic arc’ that Americans have been building for decades close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union, and in order to mend these cracks it was sought to bring under the Afghan people and also peoples of other regions.
“… External imperialist reaction is working constantly to undermine the organs of state power and disorganize the ranks of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.”
I imagine that every word of this is true.
A THOUGHT (1987)
Well, perhaps it was no wonder that almost every Afghan or Pakistani I talked to believed that I was some omnipotent C.I.A. manipulator; —that almost every Afghan or Pakistani thought that he was controlled; —that in Peshawar they kept saying that a secret deal had been made whereby the Soviets would be allowed to hold on to Afghanistan and the Americans were to take over the Middle East. — What would these people have thought if they could have been, say, in San Francisco on February 12, 1987 (a rainy day), watching an anti-Asian rally in front of the Korean Embassy, the workmen with their heavy slickers, the good old boys twirling unbrellas, waving American flags and yelling, “Flag! Flag! Flag! Flag! ” o —The young men looked serious and stupid. The older ones were smiling. Everyone was tremendously excited. The iron-workers’ union was there, saying that Korea was exporting unemployment. —“GET THE GOOKS OUT OF AMERICA! ” —For the Americans also believed that they were controlled.
And yet the situation was not entirely symmetrical. For when the Young Man learned that so many Mujahideen groups had come into play long before the final change of government, as maliciously twiddling and poking fingers of Pakistani Realpolitik, he felt a deep sense of shock — and yet he ought to have known how matters stood as soon as he saw the Brigadier’s letter!
…that after two months of the agreement we will be helped with the following: …40 Powerful explosive Bumbs…
Somehow when his own government did it, it did not seem either surprising or bad. Why was this?
STATEMENT OF THE RELIABLE SOURCE (continued)
“How do you think we can best help the Mujahideen groups now? ” the Young Man said.
“The problem is still the same as it was, ” said the Reliable Source. “It requires a central leadership; it requires a central figure who enjoys the confidence of all the elements of the Mujahideen, and that is the only way you can bring about unity amongst them. It is first amongst themselves, and then between them and the tribal elders, but first of all a program must be chopped out, about what is the best form of government that should come about initially in Afghanistan.”
“And who can that figure be if it isn’t Zaher Shah? ”
“Well, it has to be someone by consensus. In tribal society that is always simple. But the mullahs — Gulbuddin and Rabbani — they will not accept that. The tribes will accept that, yes, but not the mullahs. So again you are at cross-purposes. The fact was, in 1973 to ’77, though we voted that we wanted Zaher Shah and we did not get him, the fact is that they remained an effective group, because there was effective coordination. And that could be brought about even today. — Now, the history of Afghanistan is that the kingmakers have been the tribesmen of Pakistan. What is the kingdom of Afghanistan? It’s a grouping of tribal groups brought about by Ahmad Shah in 1747. It is a medieval age there still, a tribal society, and this is what the Russians miscalculated, and this is why there are uprisings always. Now, what was Ahmad Shah doing? If there was uprising in Kabul you use Kandahar. If an uprising in Kandahar you play off Kabul. So these two elements were always made to balance each other. Or the Pushtuns were made to balance the rest. And so this sort of thing carried on. And this was how we operated as well. This was part of our program: that the groups of Gulbuddin and all were just to raise the issue, or bring it to the focus in case something happened. Our own tribesmen, of ethnic commonality, would also move in such large numbers that they would then have their effect and bring about that change. That was the program. Now, this government again miscalculated and lost an opportunity between April of ’78 and December of ’79p—this could have been successfully achieved.”
“Given this tribal predominance and the fact that the tribes move back and forth across the Durand Line, can the Soviet Union digest Afghanistan without also digesting Pakistan? ” asked the Young Man.
“It depends, you see, ” said the Reliable Source. “They have, let us say, already digested Afghanistan to all intents and purposes. Now with the Geneva talks I think they are just going to give the situation de facto or de jure recognition. I do not think the Russians will enjoy any additional advantage by taking Pakistan. Now, Afghanistan was important from our point of view in the old times, when their objective was Delhi, and the army must move through the N.W.F.P. and those regions. But with that violently left movement in 1971, the Treaty of Friendship and things, the Russians and the Indians have a common axis, a common interest. So the objective is not Delhi anymore. If it is the Gulf, or denial of the Gulf oil to the West, then the next objective will automatically be Iran; it will not be us. If the goal is Baluchistan, then it will be us.”
“So you don’t think the Russians will care that they won’t have entirely subdued the tribes in eastern Afghanistan? ”
“The point is, if the Pakistan government is not willing to interfere in Afghan affairs, then these tribesmen will be neutralized, as they are today. With all these events taking place in Afghanistan, the tribesmen on our side remain neutral. But if the government had motivated these tribes, then of course the question would have come about.”
“What would you say the chances are of the Russians being pushed out of Afghanistan? ”
“None whatever.”
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